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Abstract
The awarding of the 2010 FIFA World Cup to South Africa was 
an historic moment for all of Africa as football’s biggest event 
travelled to the continent for the first time. This study, set five 
years on, seeks to identify the legacies left by the construction 
of two new stadiums in Durban and Cape Town. As part of the 
EU-funded CARNiVAL project, which seeks to investigate the 
legacies and impacts of hosting such events, interviews were 
conducted with key stakeholders involved in the planning of 
legacies in the two cities. Using Chappelet and Junod’s (2006) 
framework to analyse the legacies, this study found that Durban 
and Cape Town have used different strategies to leverage the 
legacies with differing results. Yet, both stadiums have suffered 
from the same issue; a seeming lack of need for two stadiums 
with capacities over 54,000, for domestic sport leagues which 
average fewer than 10,000 spectators.
Key Words: Major Sport Events, Legacy, White Elephants, World Cup; 
South Africa
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Introduction
By hosting the FIFA World Cup in 2010, South Africa became the first African 
country to host a sporting mega-event. One of the more prominently used 
definitions of a mega-event is that of Roche (2000), who claimed that mega-events 
are large-scale cultural happenings that have importance on an international scale. 
These events –which span from commercial to sporting happenings, encompass 
elements of drama, and are recognised as contributing to popular culture– are 
typically organised through collaborative schemas that involve national and 
international as well as governmental and non-governmental organisations. As 
these mega-events are moving to new and developing countries, research into the 
legacies that can be gained is becoming increasingly significant, to the extent that 
major institutions are commissioning research projects with the aim of investigating 
the value that these legacies can have. One such project is “CARNiVAL”, an EU-
funded International Research Staff Exchange Scheme (IRSES) project with 
partner institutions in the UK, Germany, Brazil, and South Africa. The present study 
is the first UK-based outcome resulting from this wider project, and offers empirical 
insights into the two stadiums developed in Cape Town and Durban, five years 
after the hosting of the World Cup. To this end, this paper uses data collected from 
key stakeholders in Cape Town and Durban, together with secondary material 
in order to provide an overview of the current state of the two stadiums, both of 
which have been labelled as unsustainable, financially-burdening ‘white elephants’ 
(Maharaj, 2011). Therefore, the primary aim here is to examine the context and 
current circumstances of the stadiums from a sporting, infrastructural, economic, 
and social perspective. 
The paper is structured as follows: The next section offers a detailed account 
of the adopted framework around which this study is formed, which is, in turn, 
supported with some key literatures on the matter of legacy in major sport events. 
Then, a brief account on the method is given before the description of the current 
situation in the two stadiums under examination becomes the core of this study. 
We conclude with some general observations based on the authors’ first-hand 
experience, while suggesting follow-up actions. 
Literature Review
Much of the literature on mega-events has been focused on the ex post impacts 
on the hosts. One of the more widely used models in the academic literature comes 
from Chappelet & Junod (2006), who identified urban, infrastructural, economic, 
social, and sporting legacies as being the most pertinent. Recently, there has 
LEGACY IN MAJOR SpORT EVENTS: EMpIRICAL INSIGhTS FROM ThE 2010 FIFA WORLD CUp 45
been a move towards other potential legacies, with a developing literature on the 
political legacies that can be gained from mega-events (Grix, 2012; haynes, 2001). 
This section will explore the literature surrounding legacies according to Chappelet 
and Junod’s (2006) categorisation, before particularly looking at the perceived 
legacies that can be left by the building of new stadiums in a host country.
The first legacies identified by Chappelet and Junod (2006) are urban legacies, 
which refer to structures that have been constructed for the hosting of a mega-
event but are not directly used for sporting purposes. Many hosts of mega-events 
are able to use their hosting as a catalyst to make investments that would not 
necessarily be available to them at other times (de Nooiij & van den Berg, 2013). 
hiller (2006) recognised that there are five specific ways in which host cities are 
redeveloped when hosting mega-events. Firstly, the major players in the city will 
seek to work together in order to improve the city, including the redevelopment of 
any old or unused buildings, and attempt to renovate them into buildings which 
will enable the development of the service economy. Thus, as the city modernises 
and focuses more on providing services, a natural change in the leisure activities 
provided takes place, as new entertainment such as restaurants, bars, theatres, 
and cultural districts will be developed. As the cities grow and are required to build 
new facilities (both for sporting and support, such as hotels), it is likely that this 
will lead to the growth and development of an ‘urban sprawl’, which will see the 
city become decentralised. And finally, the increased sprawl of the city will lead 
to increased security, which is especially important for hosts in less-developed 
nations, where the external expectation could start from a position where it is 
assumed that security would be an issue (Cornelissen & Maennig, 2010).
Similar to urban legacies are infrastructural legacies, which generally apply to the 
infrastructure that is put in place for the hosting of an event but that are not directly 
linked to the sporting aspect of the event. These can be difficult to distinguish, with 
Baumann and Matheson (2013) recognising that the infrastructure put in place 
would often not be necessary if the event was not being hosted in the first place. 
The costs for these can be viewed as ‘indirect investment costs’ (Atkinson et al., 
2008) and can then contribute to the host ex post for as long as fifty years after 
the event has taken place (Gratton et al., 2006). Indeed, the potential benefits 
from investments in a city’s infrastructure for the hosting of a mega-event make 
it difficult to judge the financial success of hosting such an event. Owen (2005) 
estimated that investments in infrastructure are nine times higher than the revenue 
and operating expenses of hosting, and thus will not be repaid during the short 
period of time in which the event is hosted. It is this long-term benefit that resulted 
in preuss’ (2007) argument that politicians should attempt to use the hosting to 
‘piggy-back’ needed investment in infrastructure that would not happen otherwise.
As previously mentioned, it can often be difficult to assess the economic legacies 
that can be gained by hosts of mega-events. This type of legacy is often the one 
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that receives the most focus from academics, with each Olympic Games since 
Seoul in 1988 having empirical studies examining its economic impact (Bridges, 
2012; Brunet, 2009; Brunet & Xinwen, 2008; hotchkiss et al., 2003; Li et al., 2011). 
Most hosts of events are hopeful of economic legacies through the multiplier 
effect; that is, that any spending before, during, and after the event will then ripple 
through the economy. however, the multiplier applied has often been criticised 
(Matheson, 2009; Siegfried & Zimbalist, 2000), while porter and Fletcher (2008) 
demonstrated an exaggeration of the impact of the hosting of the 1996 Olympic 
Games in Atlanta. A secondary way for a host to experience economic gains is for 
the hosting of the event to increase the levels of trade with other nations. Due to 
the nature of mega-events, which attract fans from all over the world supporting 
their country’s athletes, increased levels of tourism are expected to be a benefit 
from hosting such an event. Karadakis et al. (2010) identified tourism as the major 
growth area for hosts of Olympic events, while Chalip (2002) estimated that 1.6 
million additional tourists visited Australia in the years before and after the hosting 
of the 2000 Olympic Games. Yet, dispute exists as to the real benefits. Three 
important considerations are often not taken into account when appraising the 
effects that mega-events have on tourism (Matheson & Baade, 2005). Firstly, it is 
possible that some of the spending that takes place at an event would have taken 
place in the economy anyway. Secondly, displacement and crowding-out effects 
may occur, where consumers who would have otherwise spent money in the local 
area decide not to do so because the event is taking place. Finally, it is likely that 
much of the money earned in the local area will be taken out by firms who are likely 
to be multinationals or who are not based in the area. A final economic benefit that 
is often expected is an increase in employment figures. Feddersen et al. (1997) 
believe that nations may bid to host events purely to boost employment; Malfas 
et al. (2004) and hotchkiss et al. (2003) both cited the hosting of the Olympic 
Games as boosting Barcelona and Atlanta’s employment rates in 1992 and 1996, 
respectively. however, the findings of hotchkiss et al. (2003) have been disputed 
by Matheson (2006), while hagn and Maennig (2009) and du plessis and Maennig 
(2007) both questioned findings that Germany’s hosting of the 2006 FIFA World 
Cup led to a fall in unemployment, in part due the fact that many of the jobs that 
are created are needed only in the build-up to the event, and thus do not continue 
ex post (Briedenhann, 2011). Furthermore, it has been argued that hosting such 
events can lead to a rise in unemployment; Kavestos and Szymanski (2010), for 
example, argued that the diversion of funds from other areas into hosting could 
lead to cut-backs elsewhere, resulting in job losses. 
Chalip (2006) identified the ‘festival’-like qualities of mega-events as providing 
an ideal instrument for social impact. Yet, social legacies have been under-
researched, with more focus being placed on the more quantifiable economic 
impacts (Bob & Swart, 2010; Cornelissen et al., 2011). One of the most recognised 
LEGACY IN MAJOR SpORT EVENTS: EMpIRICAL INSIGhTS FROM ThE 2010 FIFA WORLD CUp 47
social legacies emanating from the hosting of a mega-event is the ‘feel-good’ factor 
that can galvanise a nation, with citizens feeling “empowered by the successful 
staging of such monumental events and by succeeding in the eyes of the world” 
(Black & van der Westhuizen, 2004, p. 1210). however, not all of the social legacies 
can be viewed as being positive for the host nation. Giulianotti et al. (2014) 
recognised a number of reasons for citizens to oppose the hosting of a mega-
event. Firstly, the prestige of hosting such events can lead to an increase in the 
living costs for residents, particularly in house pricing. Malfas et al. (2004) studied 
house price changes around the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games, discovering that 
in the build-up to the event, house prices rose by seven percent, while rent in the 
poorest areas rose by 38 percent. The second issue concerns the residents who 
live near the location of the event, supported by Malfas et al. (2004), who reported 
that 15,000 residents were evicted from their homes in the build-up to the 1996 
Olympic Games in Atlanta. 
The final legacies identified by Chappelet and Junod (2006) are sporting 
legacies, which lead to increased sports participation in the host nation, or leave 
sporting facilities to be used by the population following the event. Given the 
nature of sporting mega-events, it would be easy to assume that these legacies 
would occur naturally. Yet, haynes (2001) and Veal et al. (2012) both reported that 
sport participation in Sydney rose in the immediate aftermath of the 2000 Olympic 
Games, but were not sustained across a longer period of time. Weed et al. (2009) 
argued that the hosting of these events does not naturally lead to an increase in 
sporting participation, and that the organising committee should focus on ways to 
ensure that this legacy does occur. however, much of the research conducted has 
been focused on Olympic Games, which are multi-sport events. When research 
has been conducted around single sport events, where the interest is focused on 
one sport only, there is potentially more evidence of an increase in participation in 
this sport (Frawley & Cush, 2011).
however, sporting legacies are not just restricted to increasing participation, 
and also relate to the sporting facilities that are left behind after the conclusion 
of the event. This is often one of the major investments by hosts in the hosting 
of events, with Cape Town’s bid for the 2004 Olympic Games planning to build 
12 new stadiums and renovate a further 26 venues (Swart & Bob, 2004). The 
interpretation of the economic impact of sports facilities appears to depend on 
when and who wrote the report; pre-event economic impact projections focus on 
the economic impacts, and find benefits for the city hosting the event. Conversely, 
ex post studies often find that the economic benefits have previously been 
exaggerated, especially when the opportunity cost for these facilities are taken 
into account (Siegfried & Zimbalist, 2000; Whitson & horne, 2006). proponents 
of the building of new facilities propose that the long-term economic benefits of 
a city having a state-of-the-art facility outweigh the short-term costs. South Africa 
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spent R10 billion on stadiums for the World Cup, and would expect to recoup this 
over a longer period of time. Income for stadiums is generally gained through 
a range of direct sources such as rent, sales at the stadium, and advertising, 
coupled with indirect sources; that is, the multiplier effect that is derived from the 
growth in economic activity in the area in which the stadium is situated (Baade 
& Dye, 1990; Swindell & Rosentraub, 1998). These indirect sources of economic 
benefit include increased employment provided by the stadium (Cornelissen et 
al., 2011; Swindell & Rosentraub, 1998), although these have been criticised as 
being positions that are low quality, poorly paid, and often of a seasonal basis 
and that have little real effect (Baade & Dye, 1990; Coates, 2007). Indeed, the low 
wages paid by facilities have been shown to have a negative impact on the local 
area; Baade (1994) showed how new stadiums in Washington, D.C. and Oakland-
San Francisco, two areas that have high incomes, actually contributed to a fall 
in income per-capita. however, ex post analysis of South Africa 2010 identified 
66,000 jobs created in the construction of venues and facilities, creating R7.4 
billion on wages (approximately €740 million at 2010 rates) to be injected into the 
local economies (Sport & Recreation South Africa, 2013).
Siegfried and Zimbalist (2000) identified three other criticisms of the economic 
impact of building new stadiums; namely, the substitution effect, leakages, and the 
budgetary impact. The substitution effect occurs when spenders at the stadium 
would have spent money elsewhere. As such, the spending at the stadium is not 
in addition to the normal levels of spending, but is merely replacing spending that 
would otherwise be taking place elsewhere in the economy. Indeed, as Coates 
and humphreys (2008) argued, most of the spending at facilities would come from 
consumers’ entertainment budgets. Secondly, leakages occur when the secondary 
spend leaves the local economy. Even if consumers are spending additional 
money at the stadium, it is unlikely that this money will stay in the local area. 
Suppliers to the facility may be based outside of the area, while large proportions 
of teams’ revenues are spent on salaries for their athletes, who are unlikely to live 
in the local economic area. Finally, the budgetary impact of building stadiums 
suggests that the spending by authorities on the stadiums are often larger than 
the revenues gained, opening a question of the opportunity cost of the funding 
(Crompton, 1995; Matheson, 2006; Owen, 2005).
however, stadiums do not just contribute directly to the local economy; they can 
also play a part in the marketing and profile of a city. Firstly, as Crompton (2004) 
recognised, a city with a world-renowned sports team playing in its stadium will 
automatically receive worldwide attention. Yet, the potential for increased image can 
go further than this; there is a move towards using stadiums as a way of improving 
the image of a city, and indeed basing the tourism strategy of an economy around 
sports facilities (Barghchi et al., 2009; Maennig & du plessis, 2009; Smith, 2010). 
This is only likely to work if there is a concerted effort between the stadium and 
LEGACY IN MAJOR SpORT EVENTS: EMpIRICAL INSIGhTS FROM ThE 2010 FIFA WORLD CUp 49
economic area to align strategies (Stevens & Wootton, 2014), and is more pertinent 
in the building of stadiums outside of mega-events. In Europe, where many private 
teams own their own stadium, there should still be responsibility borne by local 
authorities, and the bearing of costs, as if this is left to the teams themselves, they 
will maximise their own utility (Allmers & Maennig, 2009; du plessis & Maennig, 
2007). Yet, the US – where much of the literature on stadiums focused its research 
– has further issues, as cities often build and renovate facilities in order to either 
keep existing teams or lure new teams to their area (Baade & Dye, 1990; Coates, 
2007; Coates & humphreys, 2008; Matheson & Baade, 2006). As such, there is 
less conflict regarding the ownership and responsibility of the stadiums, but this 
does raise questions as to which stakeholders are paying for the facility, and which 
stakeholders are expected to benefit from its usage.
As part of the R16 billion (approximately €1.6 billion) spent on ‘stadiums and 
precinct development’ (Maharaj, 2011), two new stadiums where built in Cape 
Town and Durban: the Cape Town Stadium and the Moses Mabhida Stadium, 
respectively. This significant investment was made in the belief that South Africa 
would gain significant long-term legacies, from tangible improvements in transport 
and infrastructure to increased confidence and an improved global opinion of the 
country (Sport & Recreation South Africa, 2013). The remainder of this paper will 
seek to explore how successfully these legacies are being leveraged.
Method
Research Context
Five years on from the historic 19th FIFA World Cup in South Africa in 2010, 
the present study draws on the two largest-capacity stadiums built purposefully 
to help stage the mega event: the Cape Town Stadium and the Moses Mabhida 
Stadium in Durban. This follows a visit to the two stadiums by the first two authors 
in July of 2014.
As mentioned, this study is part of a wider, EU-funded transcontinental project 
– entitled ‘CARNiVAL’ – examining why mega events fail to deliver sustainable 
legacies. The project also seeks to identify best practices which enable potential 
impacts to be realised in light of hosting such events, with the aim of enhancing 
knowledge and understanding, encouraging stakeholders to adopt sustainable 
and responsible mega-event management guidelines, and to help ensure the 
maximum return on investment for hosts in bidding and hosting mega-events.
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Data Collection
The study employs a case study approach, qualitative in nature, in order to 
offer insights into how key stakeholders in the context of the planning of events 
and the creation of the stadiums perceive the issue of legacy with regard to the 
2010 World Cup.
The first two authors carried out three in-depth interviews: firstly, a one-hour 
interview was conducted in Cape Town with the management of the Western 
Cape Government; the second meeting lasted two hours and took place with 
representatives of the Department of Sport & Recreation South Africa; finally, a two-
hour interview took place with representatives from Tourism KwaZulu-Natal, the 
organisation responsible for tourism in the KwaZulu-Natal area, in which Durban 
resides. In addition to these interviews, the authors visited the two stadiums and 
took part in their official guided tours, where additional data was gathered.
Moreover, analysis of secondary documentation has also been part of the data 
collection process. Official documents – such as the 2010 FIFA World Cup Country 
Report, produced by Sport & Recreation South Africa (2013), as well as sources 
from the mainstream media, such as the stadiums’ official websites, contemporary 
newspaper articles, and websites dedicated to providing information regarding 
the 2010 World Cup – all offered invaluable insights regarding the legacy of 
these particular sporting facilities. In essence, through this process we sought to 
ascertain the events and occurrences that have taken place at the stadiums since 
2010, and understand to what extent these happenings fulfil the pre-determined 
legacy objectives.
Findings & Discussion
Sporting 
Both the Durban and the Cape Town stadiums were newly built for the 2010 
World Cup at a significant investment. It is undeniable that both stadiums are 
impressive sights; as could be expected of a modern, FIFA-accredited venue, 
the bowl, ‘polo-mint’-shaped design of the Cape Town Stadium is both sleek and 
dynamic, with an impressive view of the pitch from any seat. Set on the Atlantic 
coast with the iconic Table Mountain as a backdrop, the stadium surely enjoys one 
of the most breath-taking surroundings in world sport. however, this alone does 
not bring spectators. Ajax Cape Town FC currently leases the 55,000-seat capacity 
stadium for its home matches, but the club is averaging just 6258 spectators for 
home attendances during the 2014/15 season to-date, and even this figure is 
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inflated by a crowd of 44,000 for one fixture against Kaiser Chiefs (ESpN, 2015a). 
According to a Western Cape government official, “Ajax Cape Town FC currently 
plays all of their matches at the stadium. It doesn’t make sense – who wants to 
see a thousand people in the stadium on TV? They should just play their bigger 
matches against Kaiser Chiefs and Orlando pirates there” (Director, Western Cape 
Government). The stadium’s official website shows upcoming concerts for Michael 
Bublé and One Direction (but no other non-sporting events for the remainder of 
2015), indicating the stadium’s lack of mechanisms for revenue (Cape Town 
Stadium, 2015).
Named in honour of the former leader of the South African Communist party, 
the Moses Mabhida Stadium in Durban is perhaps even more eye-catching than 
its counterpart in Cape Town. Moses Mabhida has hosted the Top Gear Live car 
show, and a T20 cricket match between South Africa and India in 2011, generating 
a record crowd for a cricket match held in Africa (ESpN Cricinfo, 2011). With its 
famous arch, inspired by the South African flag, the stadium lays claim to the 
world’s tallest ‘arch’ swing (Guinness World Records, 2011), which allows partakers 
to ride the swing on an arc into the centre of the stadium. With a similar seating 
capacity to Cape Town Stadium (54,000), Moses Mabhida Stadium features multi-
coloured seats designed to give the impression that the ground is full even when 
empty. presently, Moses Mabhida stadium also plays host to around half of the 
fixtures of the AmaZulu Football Club, with the club’s remaining fixtures played at 
the much smaller-scale princess Magogo stadium. The club’s average 2014/15 
season attendance of 6100 is very similar to that of Ajax Cape Town, and even 
the largest attendance of 20,000 for the Kaiser Chiefs fixture (ESpN, 2015b) would 
have filled only around one-third of Moses Mabhida Stadium. Similarly to Cape 
Town Stadium, there is only one major non-sporting event scheduled to take place 
in 2015, a concert by the American artist Chris Brown, in April (MMStadium, 2015). 
It is remarkable just how close Moses Mabhida is situated to the Kings park 
Stadium, a 52,000-capacity ground that is home to the Sharks rugby union team, 
with the two stadiums being situated adjacent to one another. Our tour guide 
talked about the Kings park stadium in some detail, mentioning the fact that it 
is in need of a major upgrade. As Moses Mabhida Stadium was built to meet the 
strict requirements of FIFA, the pitch is not of the required size to host professional 
rugby matches. Kings park was initially proposed as Durban’s stadium for the 
World Cup, but a political decision was taken to create a ‘sports precinct’. While 
this decision potentially has tourism benefits, with a number of cities using facilities 
to become a ‘sport city’ (see Smith, 2010), it has resulted in there being two large 
stadiums, neither of which can be filled with spectators on a regular basis for 
domestic sport.
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Economic 
Nearly R8 billion was spent on the two stadiums (R4.5 billion on Cape Town 
Stadium and R3.4 billion on Moses Mabhida Stadium) (Maharaj, 2011), a significant 
investment for a nation which in 2011 had over 25 percent of its population earning 
below $2 a day (The World Bank, 2013). As such, the opportunity cost for this 
funding has been criticised, with Briedenhann (2011 p.21) finding that 64 percent 
of respondents believed that “the money spent on the construction of the World 
Cup stadiums would have been better spent on housing, health and education 
facilities for deprived communities.” however, while this has been a criticism of 
the 2010 FIFA World Cup, residents in South Africa appear to have mixed views: 
Bassa and Jaggernath (2010) found that 66 percent of respondents in Durban 
believed that the Moses Mabhida stadium could be viewed as a positive outcome, 
whilst Swart and Bob (2012) found that over 85 percent of respondents in Cape 
Town believed that the World Cup would generate employment opportunities. 
Moreover, a similar number agreed or strongly agreed that “the event will be a 
major boost for economic development in the areas where stadiums are located” 
(ibid., pp. 112-113).
Yet, while Cape Town has the backdrop of Table Mountain, it was striking to 
feel not only the emptiness of the location, but also how unused and pristine it still 
felt. Immaculate polished floors, spotless walkways, and fully prepared conference 
rooms could all be viewed, but there seemed to be very few people around, aside 
from the stadium tour guide and a small number of tourists. perhaps the most 
poignant sight of all was inside the stadium itself, being confronted by a mass of 
grey seats covered with plastic. According to the tour guide, “these haven’t been 
needed for a while”, highlighting the lack of attendees at the stadium since the 
World Cup. As such, it is not surprising to hear that the stadium is losing around 
R4.4 million annually (approximately €440,000) in maintenance costs alone 
(Maharaj, 2011). At R45 for an adult tour (around €4.50), it is difficult to envisage 
this activity adding much revenue to the bottom line. Just as strikingly, Cape 
Town offers tourists the opportunity to visit the townships around the city, where 
corrugated iron is in stark contrast to the state-of-the-art stadium situated just a few 
miles away. Comparatively, the Moses Mabhida stadium in Durban appeared to be 
far better integrated into the city, due in part to other income-generating facilities in 
operation, such as a café, gift shop, sky ride, and the aforementioned arch swing.
Both the stadiums in Cape Town and Durban contribute to the tourism efforts of 
their respective cities, adding to a number of cities that have hosted mega-events 
and that have used this fact to signal a ‘world-class city’ status (Coates, 2007). 
Indeed, interviews with management at Tourism KwaZulu-Natal revealed the 
importance of the World Cup for a city such as Durban, with articles in international 
newspapers such as the Washington post being published with an opening line 
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of “Oh Durban, where have you been my whole World Cup?” (Goff, 2010). The 
hosting of World Cup matches helped to “turn around the image” of the city, 
while investment into infrastructure contributed to an uplift of the image of the city 
(KwaZulu-Natal Conventions Bureau, personal communication). The building of 
new stadiums can trigger urban redevelopment within a city and boost tourism, 
and Durban’s Moses Mabhida, with its iconic arch, is no exception. Allmers and 
Maennig (2009) recognised how the Moses Mabhida stadium was being designed 
as an ‘iconic building’, with a design that is aimed to embed it into the local area. 
Indeed, it is noticeable that the Moses Mabhida stadium features prominently on 
the Durban Tourism Website, whereas the Cape Town stadium appears far less 
prominently (Durban Tourism, 2015; Cape Town Tourism, 2015).
Social
While the previous section has covered the ways in which Durban and Cape 
Town have used the hosting of World Cup matches to affect the world’s views 
on the two cities in question, social legacies concentrate on the local residents. 
These often go hand in hand with economic legacies: if an area is boosted from an 
economic standpoint, this will have an impact on the area from a social standpoint. 
Sport & Recreation South Africa (2013) claimed that 91 percent of South Africans 
believe that hosting the event united the nation. This is likely to have been a key 
objective following on from previously hosting the 1995 Rugby World Cup and 1996 
African Cup of Nations, and using the national team’s success as a tool for nation 
unity. While it is probable that publications by Sport & Recreation South Africa are 
likely to report the tournament in a positive light, they do appear to corroborate 
findings by Bassa and Jaggernauth (2010), who found that 64 percent of residents 
living close to Moses Mabhida believed that their standard of living would improve. 
Furthermore, while it has been previously reported that the building of stadiums 
can be disruptive for local residents (Jones, 2001), Bassa and Jaggernauth (2010) 
found that 55 percent of interviewees were not disrupted, while the others listed 
noise, overcrowding, and traffic congestion as negative externalities from the 
construction of stadiums.
Yet, the social impacts of Cape Town’s stadium, situated in Green point, 
have been one of the more contentious issues of the World Cup. South Africa 
initially proposed the Newlands rugby ground (51,900 capacity) as Cape Town’s 
choice of venue – a stadium that FIFA reported would be “easily suitable” (FIFA 
Inspection Report in Alegi, 2007, p. 318). however, the local government believed 
that championing Athlone Stadium (34,000 capacity) in the under-resourced 
Cape Flats would address the woefully inadequate provision of sporting facilities 
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in black communities and football’s dependency on rugby grounds. The City of 
Cape Town believed that using Athlone adhered to FIFA’s social responsibility 
objectives, as it would help the most disadvantaged communities; however, FIFA 
were reluctant for its showcase event to have a backdrop of low-cost housing and 
poverty. Instead, FIFA proposed Green point, within walking distance of the V&A 
Waterfront, one of Cape Town’s prime tourist locations. The South African Local 
Organising Committee endorsed this view, with Green point going on to host eight 
World Cup matches, including Netherland’s semi-final victory over Uruguay (Alegi, 
2007). The decision to use Green point as opposed to Athlone limited the social 
legacy that Cape Town could receive, given that instead of one of the poorest 
areas of the city gaining an injection of ‘development’, the stadium was instead 
located near the picturesque V&A Waterfront, an area already visited by tourists. 
Furthermore, the change in venues disrupted the legacy for local residents, with 
Swart and Bob (2012) finding that local residents in both areas were not entirely 
sure of where the legacy stadium would be. Yet findings by Bob and Swart (2009) 
and Bob and Majola (2011) revealed that communities both in Cape Town and 
Durban were generally positive to the notion of staging a World Cup.
Infrastructural 
South Africa upgraded its transport network, including the new Gautrain rail 
system (Allmers & Maennig, 2009), for its hosting of the 2010 FIFA World Cup; 
however, it claimed that this was an investment that would have been made 
irrespective of whether or not it had won the bid (Bob & Swart, 2010). As Cape Town 
Stadium was built upon an existing sport site, and is within walking distance of one of 
Cape Town’s primary tourist hubs, there was little need for increased infrastructure. 
The Cape Town stadium does not have a dedicated station, with public transport 
consisting of buses and park-and-ride facilities. This was highlighted as an issue 
during our interviews with the Western Cape Government; the MyCiTi bus route 
has become the ‘foundation’ for Cape Town during the World Cup. There were 
broader plans for more advanced transport systems, but during the World Cup 
itself, this was based purely around the stadium. Since then, however, MyCiti has 
subsequently been further expanded around the city (Western Cape Government, 
personal communication). Currently, for big events, dedicated event shuttles are 
provided from various areas of the city, highlighting the lack of a dedicated transport 
infrastructure to the stadium. Furthermore, interviews with the Department of Sport 
& Recreation South Africa revealed that the Cape Town road system was upgraded, 
a network which has subsequently become known as ‘2010 roads’ (Department of 
Sport & Recreation South Africa, personal communication). Conversely, in Durban, 
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a new R140 million (approximately €14 million at 2010 prices) train station was 
opened in 2010 prior to the World Cup, designed to serve spectators visiting the 
stadium. This station is currently in operation, and is used not only for the events 
that are held at Moses Mabhida, but also to better integrate the stadium with the 
rest of the city. While this station was designed solely to accommodate spectators 
at Moses Mabhida, it is also worth noting that Durban built a new airport in the build-
up to the event, with King Shaka International Airport opening in April 2010.
Conclusion
It has been stated by many scholars that it is unlikely that mega events will result 
in the widespread anticipated economic and social benefits, particularly considering 
that these events are essentially controlled by outside forces – FIFA, in this case 
(Bassa & Jaggernath, 2010). Cape Town and Durban have taken different routes 
in their attempt to leverage the billions spent on new stadiums. Whereas Cape 
Town Stadium is situated near a popular tourist destination and Table Mountain 
as backdrop, it is Durban, out of the two, which has better utilised the stadium. 
Whereas Cape Town Stadium appears to be isolated in its location, Moses Mabhida 
Stadium was buzzing with tourists, who were using the café and shops at the 
stadium as well as visiting the famous arch. however, both stadiums are struggling 
to attract fans to regular sporting events, averaging an attendance of around 
6000 in stadiums with capacities that are ten times larger. Without an increase in 
attendances, it is unlikely that the stadiums will ever become self-funding or will 
indeed contribute to the rebranding of the cities.
The present papers’ findings do highlight the issues with FIFA taking World 
Cups to developing nations that currently cannot sustain the levels of attendances 
that are seen during the event itself. FIFA presently requires hosts to provide one 
stadium for the opening ceremony and final match with a capacity of 80,000, two 
stadiums for semi-finals with capacities of 60,000, and the remaining matches to 
played in stadiums with capacities of at least 40,000. With FIFA also requiring 
matches to be hosted across the country in order to boost the reach of the events, 
this potentially results in a number of ‘white elephants’ being spread across the 
hosting country. As such, if FIFA’s policy of taking events to developing nations 
is to continue, there perhaps needs to be more thought regarding the nature of 
the facilities that are used. South Africa already had a number of stadiums that 
were of the required capacity, including Kings park Stadium and Newlands Rugby 
Ground, in Durban and Cape Town, respectively. perhaps, it would have been 
more efficient for South Africa to redevelop these stadiums, rather than building 
new ones in the same city.
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